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Abstract. P2P systems are increasingly used for eﬃcient, scalable data
sharing. Popular applications focus on massive ﬁle sharing. However,
advanced applications such as online communities (e.g., medical or re-
search communities) need to share private or sensitive data. Currently,
in P2P systems, untrusted peers can easily violate data privacy by us-
ing data for malicious purposes (e.g., fraudulence, proﬁling). To prevent
such behavior, the well accepted Hippocratic database principle states
that data owners should specify the purpose for which their data will
be collected. In this paper, we apply such principles as well as reputa-
tion techniques to support purpose and trust in structured P2P systems.
Hippocratic databases enforce purpose-based privacy while reputation
techniques guarantee trust. We propose a P2P data privacy model which
combines the Hippocratic principles and the trust notions. We also
present the algorithms of PriServ, a DHT-based P2P privacy service
which supports this model and prevents data privacy violation. We show,
in a performance evaluation, that PriServ introduces a small overhead.
1 Introduction
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems provide eﬃcient solutions for distributed data shar-
ing which can scale up to very large amounts of data and numbers of users.
Online peer-to-peer (P2P) communities such as professional ones (e.g., medical
or research) are becoming popular due to increasing needs on data sharing. In
such communities, P2P environments oﬀer valuable characteristics (e.g., scala-
bility, distribution, autonomy) but limited guarantees concerning data privacy.
They can be considered as hostile because data, that can be sensitive or conﬁ-
dential, can be accessed by everyone (by potentially untrustworthy peers) and
used for everything (e.g., for marketing, proﬁling, fraudulence or for activities
against the owners preferences or ethics).
Data privacy is the right of individuals to determine for themselves when, how
and to what extent information about them is communicated to others [14]. It
has been treated by many organizations and legislations which have deﬁned well
accepted principles. According to OECD1, data privacy should consider: collec-
1 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. One of the world’s
largest and most reliable source of comparable statistics, on economic and social
data. http://www.oecd.org/
A. Hameurlain and A M. Tjoa (Eds.): Globe 2009, LNCS 5697, pp. 85–98, 2009.
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tion limitation, purpose speciﬁcation, use limitation, data quality, security safe-
guards, openness, individual participation, and accountability. From these prin-
ciples we underline purpose speciﬁcation which states that data owners should
be able to specify the purpose (data access objective) for which their data will be
collected and used. Several solutions that follow the OECD guidelines have been
proposed. A major solution is Hippocratic databases [2,9] where purpose-based
access control is enforced by using privacy metadata, i.e. privacy policies and pri-
vacy authorizations stored in tables. A privacy policy deﬁnes for each attribute,
tuple or table the access purpose, the potential users and retention period while
privacy authorization deﬁnes which purposes each user is authorized to use.
In addition to purpose-based data privacy, to prevent data misuse, it is nec-
essary to trust users. Reputation techniques verify the trustworthiness of peers
by assigning them trust levels [7,10,13]. A trust level is an assessment of the
probability that a peer will not cheat.
Motivations. In the context of P2P systems, few solutions for data privacy have
been proposed. They focus on a small part of the general problem of data pri-
vacy, e.g. anonymity of uploaders/downloaders, linkability (correlation between
uploaders and downloaders), content deniability, data encryption and authentic-
ity [3,8]. However, the problem of data privacy violation due to data disclosure
to malicious peers is not addressed.
As a motivating example, consider a collaborative application where a com-
munity of researchers, doctors, students and patients focus on the evolution of
cardiovascular diseases (e.g. heart attacks, atherosclerosis, etc.). In such appli-
cation, doctors share selected patients’ records, researchers share last research
results and this information is considered as sensitive. In order to control disclo-
sure without violating privacy, data access should respect the privacy preferences
deﬁned by concerned users, for instance:
– A researcher may allow reading access on her research results to doctors for
diagnosing and to students for analyzing.
– A doctor may allow writing access on her diagnosis to researchers for adding
comments.
In this P2P application, sharing data (i.e., medical records, research results)
based on privacy preferences is a challenge. Purposes deﬁned by users (e.g. di-
agnosing, analyzing, etc.) should be respected. In addition, data should not be
shared equally by all users. It is necessary to consider the concept of trust among
users. For instance, doctors need to trust researchers to share their private data
with them. Currently, P2P systems do not take into account privacy preferences.
In this context, an eﬃcient P2P purpose-based privacy service with trust control
is needed.
Contributions. This paper has two main contributions.
– We propose a P2P data privacy model in which we combine several concepts
related to P2P data privacy. We use this model as a basis to enforce users
privacy preferences.
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– We propose PriServ2, a DHT privacy service which, based on the proposed
model, prevents privacy violation by limiting malicious data access. For that,
we use purpose-based access control and trust techniques. In PriServ, we
consider that private data are stored and managed by their owners. The
system manages only data references. To our knowledge, PriServ is the ﬁrst
proposition that introduces data access based on purposes in P2P systems.
The performance evaluation of our approach through simulation shows that
the overhead introduced by PriServ is small.
Next, Section 2 discusses related work. Section 3 presents our P2P data pri-
vacy model. Section 4 presents PriServ our privacy service. Section 5 describes
performance evaluation. Section 6 shows current work. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Work
The ﬁrst work that uses purposes in data access is Hippocratic databases [2].
Inspired by the Hippocratic Oath and guided by privacy regulations, authors
propose ten principles that should be preserved, namely, purpose speciﬁcation,
consent of the donor, limited collection, limited use, limited disclosure, limited
retention, accuracy, safety, openness and compliance. Subsequent works have
proposed solutions for Hippocratic databases. In [9], the goal is to enforce privacy
policies within existing applications. In [1], the authors address the problem of
how current relational DBMS can be transformed into their privacy-preserving
equivalents. In this paper, compared to those works which enforce purpose-based
disclosure control in a centralized relational datastore, we apply the Hippocratic
database principles to P2P networks.
Many P2P systems propose access control services. OceanStore [8] provides
eﬃcient location of data. Protected data are encrypted and access control is
based on two types of restrictions: reader and writer restrictions. Compared
to OceanStore, our work improves private data access by adding the notion of
purpose. Freenet [3] is a distributed storage system which focuses on privacy
and security issues. It uses anonymous communications. Messages are not send
directly from sender to recipient, thus, uploader and downloader anonymity is
preserved. Besides, all stored ﬁles are encrypted so that a node can deny the
knowledge of the content. In this work, we deal with data privacy protection
and we do not address peer anonymity nor content deniability.
Other works propose trust-based management systems [7,10,13]. In [13], a
considerable number of trust models and algorithms have been presented to
tackle the problem of decentralized trust management. In [7], authors employ a
shared global history of peer interactions to identify potential malicious owners.
In [10], a peer A asks for trust levels to a limited number of peers called friends.
Friends are trustworthy peers from the point of view of A. A calculates a mean
value from collected trust levels. PriServ uses [10] because it generates a low
2 In [6], our ﬁrst ideas were proposed.
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trust level searching cost. Unlike [10] where the trustworthiness of data owners
is veriﬁed, in our work the trustworthiness of data requesters is veriﬁed.
Our privacy service marries reputation-based trust and purpose-based access
control. Trust-based systems do not take into account the notion of purpose.
This makes PriServ diﬀerent from the existent trust management systems.
3 P2P Data Privacy Model
This section presents our P2P data privacy model.
Peer Types. In our model, we can have three distinguished types of peers:
– Requester. A peer that requests data in the system.
– Owner. A peer that provides data to the system. It owns the data it shares.
– Reference manager. A peer that stores meta-information as data
references, owner identiﬁers, etc.
Privacy Policy. Each data owner can have its own privacy preferences which
are reﬂected in privacy policies. A privacy policy can include:
– Users. Peers who have the right to access data. A user can be an individual
or a group.
– Access rights. Authorizations that determine what a peer can do with
data. We use three basic types of access: read, write and disclose (delegate).
– Access purposes. Objectives for which peers can access data.
– Conditions. Conditions under which data can be accessed. This may
concern data values, for example age>10.
– Obligations. Obligations which a user must accomplish after the data ac-
cess, for example a researcher Ri should return research results after using
the record of patient x.
– Retention time. A time to limit the retention of the data, for example, a
researcher should destroy the record of patient x after 6 months.
– Minimal trust levels. Minimal trust levels3which requester peers should
have in order to gain access to data.
Trust. It is a fuzzy concept where trusted peers are supposed to respect privacy
policies deﬁned by data owners. Trust control uses many concepts:
– Trust levels. They reﬂect a peer reputation with respect to other peers. A
peer can have diﬀerent trust levels at diﬀerent peers. Trust levels vary in a
range of [0,1]. For instance, an honest peer can have a trust level in a range
of [0.5, 1] and a malicious peer in a range of [0, 0.5]. Peers can locally register
the trust levels of some peers which have interacted with them.
– Reputation. A peer reputation is an overall estimation of the peer behavior
generally calculated from its trust levels given by peers who know it.
– Friends. A friend of a peer P is a peer with a high trust level from P’s point
of view. The number of friends held by a peer can vary from one peer to
another.
3 These levels’ deﬁnition depends on the used trust model and the owner’s opinion [13].
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Operations. A peer can publish data, request data, or search for a trust level.
publishing(dataID, purpose). An owner uses this function to publish its data
references created from its private data (dataID) and the corresponding access
purpose (purpose). Publishing references allow to share private data without
violating their privacy. These references allow requesters to ﬁnd owners and ask
them for data access. An owner has complete control of its private data which
guarantees data privacy.
requesting(dataID, purpose). A requester uses this function to request data
(dataID) for a speciﬁc purpose (purpose). Including the access purpose in data
requests represents a contract between requesters and owners. At the same time,
that makes requesters aware of their responsibilities on the data usage.
searchTrustLevel(peerID1, peerID2, nestL). A peer (peerID1 ) uses this
function4 to search the trust level of another peer (peerID2 ). The parameter
nestL deﬁnes the nested level of searching.
Data Model. In order to respect privacy policies, we deﬁne a speciﬁc data
model where privacy policies are associated with data5.
Data Table. Each owner stores locally the data it wants to share in data
tables. Tables 1 and 2 show two data tables. Table 1 contains the research result
of researcher Ri and Table 2 contains medical records of doctor Dj.
Table 1. Data table of researcher Ri
Data table DTi
Age Gender Smoker Risk of heart attack
18 - 35 Female No 7 % (rated 1)
35 - 50 Male Yes 50 % (rated 4)
50 - 80 Female Yes 80 % (rated 5)
Table 2. Data table of doctor Dj
Data table DTj
PatientID (PK) Name Country Birthdate Gender Smoker Diagnosis
Pat1 Alex France 1990 Male Yes No cardiovascular disease
Pat2 Chris France 1973 Male No Cardiovascular disease (rated 2)
Pat3 Elena Russia 1968 Female Yes Cardiovascular disease (rated 4)
Purpose Table. It contains information about the available purposes: purpose
identiﬁer, purpose name, purpose description, etc.
Privacy Policies Table. Each owner stores data contained in privacy policies
in a table named privacy policies table. In this table, each line corresponds to a
privacy policy which contains an id, data subject to privacy (table, column or
line), access rights (read, write, disclose), allowed users, access purposes, condi-
tions, and the required minimal trust level of allowed users. Table 3 shows the
privacy policies table of doctor Dj.
4 The use of the trust function is optional.
5 In this paper, we use relational tables. However our model supports any type of data
(XML documents, multimedia ﬁles, etc.).
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Table 3. Privacy policies table of doctor Dj
Privacy policies table PPTj
ID Data Access User Purpose Condition Minimal
Table Column PK right trust level
PP1 DTj — Pat3 r/w Di Updating — 0.65
PP2 DTj Diagnosis Pat2 r Pat2 Seeing diagnosis — 0.5
PP3 DTj — — r/w/d Dj Monitoring — 0.9
PP4 DTj Birthdate — r Researchers Research on Birthdate 0.6
cardiovascular disease < 2000
4 PriServ
In this section, we present PriServ, a service which, based on the privacy model
of the previous section, prevents privacy violation in DHT-based systems.
4.1 Design Choices
In this section, we present PriServ main design choices.
DHT. All DHT systems (e.g. Chord [12], Pastry [11], etc.) support a distributed
lookup protocol that eﬃciently locates the peer that stores a particular data
item. Data location is based on associating a key with each data item, and
storing the key/data item pair at the peer to which the key maps. A DHT maps
a key k to a peer P called responsible for k with respect to a hash function h.
Every peer has the IP address of log N peers in its ﬁnger table. DHT provides
two basic operations, each incurring O(logN) messages.
– put(k, data) stores a key k and its associated data in the DHT.
– get(k) retrieves the data associated with k in the DHT.
All DHT systems can be used in PriServ. We choose Chord for its eﬃciency and
simplicity.
Data keys. In PriServ, peer identiﬁers are chosen by hashing the peer IP
address and data keys are calculated by hashing the pair (dataID, purpose).
dataID is a unique data identiﬁer and purpose is the data access purpose6.
dataID should not contain private data (e.g. patient name, country, etc.) but
only meta-information (table name, column, etc.) (see Table 4). Because keys
include access purposes, requesting data is always made for a deﬁned purpose.
This allows to enhance purpose-based access control.
Required Tables. In PriServ, each reference manager maintains locally a refer-
ence table which contains keys and corresponding owner identiﬁers. Each owner
maintains locally a trust table and a private table. A trust table contains the
trust level of some peers in the system. A private table shows the mapping of
the requested keys with corresponding privacy policies.
6 [4] has analyzed how to manage schemas and process simple queries eﬃciently in a
ﬂexible P2P environment. Thus, we consider that all peers accessing the same data
are capable of schema mapping and that peers allowed to access particular data are
informed of their allowed purposes. Thus, requester peers are able to produce keys.
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Table 4. Private table of the doctor Dj
Private table
Privacy
DataID Purpose Key policy
DTj.Pat3 Updating 21 PP1
DTj Monitoring 71 PP3
DTj.Birthdate Researching on 83 PP4
cardiovascular disease
DTj.Pat3 Having second diagnosis 96 PP5
4.2 PriServ Algorithms
PriServ implements the P2P data privacy model proposed in Section 3. In par-
ticular, it focuses on the publishing, requesting and searchTrustLevel operations.
Publishing algorithm. In PriServ, when a peer enters the system, it uses
the put(key, ownerID) function to publish the key/ownerID pair of the data it
shares. The owner hashes the data identiﬁer and the access purpose parameters of
the publishing(dataID, purpose) function to produce the data key. This allows
to avoid requesting data for invalid purposes because keys corresponding to
invalid access purposes will not be available in the system. Unlike the traditional
DHT put(key, data) function, instead of publishing shared data (data), the data
provider identiﬁer is published. Thus data are not published in the system. Only
data providers control their data sharing.
Requesting algorithm. (Figure 1). Data requesting is done in two steps. First,
the requester hashes the data identiﬁer and the access purpose parameters of the
requesting(dataID, purpose) function to produce the data key. It searches for
the reference manager in order to get the owner identiﬁer bu using the get(key)
function. Second, the requester contacts the owner to retrieve data. The owner
veriﬁes locally the privacy policy corresponding to the data key. In particular,
the owner veriﬁes the trustworthiness of the requester.
Trust level searching algorithm. If a peer (ID) has the trust level of the
requester (requesterID) in its trust table, this level is returned directly and the
peer (ID) does not have to contact other peers. If a peer does not have the
requester trust level, PriServ deﬁnes three methods for searching the requester
trust level in the system:
– With-friends algorithm (Figure 2). Each peer has at least one friend, the
owner asks its friends for the trust level of the requester. Each received trust
level (RTL) is weighted with the trust level (FTL) of the sending friend. The
ﬁnal trust level is computed from the received trust levels. Searching for the
requester trust level is recursive7. If a friend does not have the requested
7 In order to assure that a peer will not be contacted twice, we consider the trust
level searching as a tree in which the owner is the root and the depth is equal to the
maximum depth of searching. Contacted peers form the tree nodes. If a peer already
exists in the branch where it should be added, it will not be contacted a second time.
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0: requesting(dataID,purpose)
1: begin
2: ownerID is initialized to null;
3: requestedData is initialized to null;
4: key = hashFunction(dataID,purpose);
5: ownerID = DHT.get(key);
6: if (ownerID not null) do
7: requestedData = retrieve(requesterID,
ownerID, key);
8: return requestedData
9: end;
10: retrieve(requesterID, ownerID, key)
11: begin
12: requestedData is initialized to null;
13: nestL is intitialized to 0;
14: if(requesterID has the rigth to
access data correspondant to key) do
15: requesterTrustL = searchTrustLevel
(ownerID,requesterID,nestL);
16: if(requesterTrustL is higher than
minTrustL)
17: requestedData = data correspondant
to key;
18: return requestedData
19: end;
Fig. 1. Requesting algorithm
0: searchTrustLevel(ID,requesterID,nestL)
1: begin
2: requesterTrustLevel is initialized to 0;
3: if(nestL has reached MaxDepth)
4: if(trustL of requesterID in trustTable)
5: requesterTrustL=trustL of requesterID;
6: else
7: return -1;
8: else
9: if(trustL of requesterID in trustTable)
10: requesterTrustL=trustL of requesterID;
11: else
12: nestL is incremented;
13: NbPeersContacted is initialized to 0;
14: for each friend
15: FTL = trustL of friendID;
16: RTL = searchTrustLevel(friendID,
requesterID,nestL);
17: if (RTL != -1)
18: FTL*RTL is added to requesterTrustL;
19: NbPeersContacted is incremented;
20: requesterTrustL = requesterTrustL /
NbPeerscontacted;
21: return requesterTrustL
22:end;
Fig. 2. SearchTrustLevel: with-friends
trust level it asks for it to its friends and the number of nested levels (nestL)
is incremented. Recursion is limited by a predeﬁned number of iterations
(MaxDepth). The maximum number of contacted friends can also be limited
to a predeﬁned number.
– Without-friends algorithm. Each peer does not have friends. The algorithm
will proceed in the same way as the with-friends algorithm. However, instead
of contacting friends, an owner will contact the peers in its ﬁnger table
(O(LogN) peers).
– With-or-without-friends algorithm. Each peer may have friends or not. In
this case, if an owner has some friends, it uses the with-friends algorithm,
otherwise it uses the without-friends algorithm.
Figure 3 illustrates the data requesting algorithm and the with-friends algorithm
to search for trust levels. P18 requests data corresponding to key 21 from P25.
P25 returns P36 which is the owner peer of 21. Then P18 contacts P36. P36
contacts its friends (P54) to ﬁnd the trust level of P18. P54 does not have the
trust level of P18 in its trust table so it contacts also its friends (P25). P25 has
the trust level and sends it to P54. P54 updates its trust table and sends the
trust level of P18 to P36. As it is higher than the level required in PP1 (i.e.,
0.65) the access is granted.
To summarize, PriServ allows to prevent malicious access based on privacy
policies and requester trust levels. A contract between requesters and owners is
established by including access purposes to data requests. Owners control the
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Fig. 3. Data requesting: with-friends algorithm
access to their private data and requesters are aware of their responsibilities on
the data usage.
4.3 Cost Analysis
In this section, we analyze the costs of the previous algorithms in terms of
number of messages. We do not analyze the join/leave cost which is the same of
Chord with the advantage that data transfer of a leaving/joining peer is lighter
in PriServ because only data references are stored in the system.
Publishing, data requesting and retrieving costs are in O(logN) as explained
in [6]. However trust level searching cost (CSTL) is diﬀerent in function of the
trust searching algorithm:
– With-friends algorithm. This cost depends on the number of friends (NF)
and the maximum depth of the nested search (MaxDepth).
CSTLWF =
∑MaxDepth
i=1 NF
i = O(NFMaxDepth)
– Without-friends algorithm. This cost depends on the number of ﬁngers which
is log N and the maximum depth of the nested search (MaxDepth).
CSTLWOF =
∑MaxDepth
i=1 (logN)
i = O((logN)MaxDepth)
– With-or-without-friends algorithm. This cost depends on the number of
friends (NF), the number of ﬁngers which is log N and the maximum depth
of the nested search (MaxDepth).
CSTLWWF = O((max(logN,NF ))
MaxDepth)
The trust level searching cost CSTL can be one of the three costs CSTLWF ,
CSTLWOF or CSTLWWF . Note that if NF > log N, CSTLWWF is equal to CSTLWF ,
else it is equal to CSTLWOF . In all cases CSTLWWF can be used for CSTL:
CSTL = O((max(logN,NF ))
MaxDepth)
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To summerize,
Cpublishing = O(nbData ∗ nbPurpose ∗ logN)
CRequesting = CRequest + CRetrieve + CSTL
= 2O(logN) +O((max(logN,NF ))MaxDepth) = O((max(logN,NF ))MaxDepth)
Compared to the traditional DHT functions, Crequest and Cretrieve costs do not
introduce communication overhead in term of number of messages. However,
CSTL increases the data requesting cost due to the nested search. Next section
shows how this cost can be reduced and stabilized to a minimum cost.
5 Performance Evaluation
In [6], we have shown by simulation that publishing and data requesting costs are
in O(logN) and that having ten access purposes per datum (which is realistic)
PriServ is scalable. This section evaluates the performance of the trust level
searching cost and the stabilization of the trust level searching cost.
For the simulation, we use SimJava [5]. We simulate the Chord protocol with
some modiﬁcations in the put() and get() functions. The parameters of the sim-
ulation are shown in Table 5. In our tests, we consider N peers with a number
of data keys equal to the number of data multiplied by the number of purposes.
Data and peer keys are selected randomly between 0 and 2n. In our simulation,
we set n to 11 which corresponds to 211 peers. This number of users is largely
suﬃcient for collaborative applications like medical research.
Trust Level Searching Cost. We measure the trust level searching cost (in
number of messages) versus the number of peers for the three algorithms.
With-friends algorithm. We consider that peers have the same number of friends
(NF ) and the maximum depth (MaxDepth) is set to 11 (the highest maximum
depth we allow in the simulation). Figure 4.a illustrates 3 measures where we
consider 1, 4 and 10 friends. Those measures are slightly diﬀerent of the cost
model where the cost is O(NFMaxDepth) thanks to our tree-based optimization
and because the probability to contact twice a peer in a system of 100 peers is
higher than in a system of 1000 peers. That is why in Figure 4.a, the trust level
searching cost increases with the number of peers. We observe that for a small
number of friends the trust level searching costs depends only on the number of
friends as predicted by our cost model.
Without-friends algorithm. Figure 4.b illustrates 4 measures where the maxi-
mum depth of searching varies between 1, 2, 3 and 11. We recall that the number
of contacted peers is log(N). Thus, the trust level searching costs is logarithmic
for small values of depth. This cost increases with the maximum depth of search-
ing as predicted by our cost model.
With-or-without-friends algorithm. We consider that the probability that a peer
has friends in our simulation is 0.9. Figure 4.c illustrates 3 measures where the
maximum depth of searching varies between 5, 8 and 11. We observe that the
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a. With-friends algorithm b. Without-friends algorithm
c. With-or-without-friends algorithm d. Comparison of the three algorithms
Fig. 4. Trust level searching costs
trust level searching cost is rather logarithmic for small values of depth. This
cost increases with the maximum depth as predicted by our cost model8.
Comparison. Figure 4.d compares the three algorithms seen above. We con-
sider a number of friends equal to 2 and a maximum depth equal to 11. As
predicted before, the with-friends case introduces the smallest cost while the
without-friends case introduces the highest. However, intuitively, the probabil-
ity to ﬁnd the trust level is higher in the without-friends algorithm than in the
with-friends algorithm. This is due to the fact that the number of contacted
peers is higher in the without-friends algorithm, which increases the probability
to ﬁnd the trust level. We estimate that the with-or-without-friends algorithm
is the most optimized because it is a tradeoﬀ between the probability to ﬁnd the
requester trust level and the trust level searching cost.
Stabilization of the Trust Level Searching Cost. We now focus on the
number of messages used to search the trust level of a requesting peer versus
the number of its requests. Here we consider the three algorithms of trust (see
Figure 5). We observe that the number of messages decreases and stabilizes after
a number of searches. This is due to the fact that the more a peer requests for
data, the more it gets known by the peers in the system.
8 We do not measure in this case the trust level searching cost versus the number of
friends which will be the same as the with-friends case.
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Table 5. Table of parameters
Simulation parameters
Variable Description default
n Number of bits 11
in the key/peer
N Number of peers 211
FC Number of friends 2
MaxDepth Maximum depth 11
of trust searching
Fig. 5. Stabilization of the trust level
searching cost
When peers ask for a trust level, answers are returned in the requesting order
and the trust tables are updated with the missing trust level. Thus, the trust
tables evolve with the number of searches. After a while, these tables stabilize.
Thus, the number of messages for searching trust levels is reduced to a stable
value. This value is not null because of the dynamicity of peers9.
We also observe in Figure 5, that the trust level searching cost in the without-
friends algorithm stabilizes ﬁrst. This is due to the fact that a larger number
of peers are contacted in this algorithm. The with-or-without-friends algorithm
comes in second place, and the with-friends algorithm comes last. As we have
seen in the comparison of the three algorithms, we ﬁnd again that the with-or-
without-friends algorithm is the most optimized because it is a tradeoﬀ between
the time to stabilization and the trust level searching cost.
6 Current Work
Storing data on owner peers gives a maximal guaranty of privacy protection.
However, this hypothesis may aﬀect availability if the owner peer fails or leaves.
To improve availability, we are working on extending PriServ functionalities
where owners will choose to store locally their data or to distribute them on the
system. Because distribution depends on the DHT, owners could see their private
data stored on untrusted peers. To overcome this problem, before distribution,
data will be encrypted and decryption keys will be stored and duplicated by
owners. This will guarantee that a) private data are protected from malicious
server peers, and b) an owner is able to control the access to its data since a
requester peer should contact him to obtain decryption keys. In addition, owners
will be able to recover their data from local storage failures.
Another extension of PriServ focuses on veriﬁcation to detect misbehaviors of
malicious peers. The idea is to be able of auditing the storage space dedicated
to PriServ by monitoring data distribution and data access.
9 In our simulation, we consider that the number of peers joining the system is equal
to those leaving the system. Thus, there are always new peers which do not know
the requester trust level.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we addressed the problem of protecting data privacy in structured
P2P systems. We apply the Hippocratic database principle to enforce purpose-
based privacy. We also use reputation-based trust management in order to verify
the trustworthiness of requester peers. Our solution is a P2P data privacy model
which combines Hippocratic principles and trust notions. We also proposed the
algorithms of PriServ, a DHT-based P2P privacy service which supports this
model and prevents data privacy violation. The performance evaluation of our
solution through simulation shows that the overhead introduced by PriServ is
small.
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